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necessarily raising the problems associated with
attributions of intentionality? The general focus of this
paper, then, concerns my interest in the conditions that
make moral judgments about animals true. Hence, I am
concerned with moral epistemology, not axiology.
In Part I, I present a cursory analysis of Stich's view
concerning ascriptions of beliefs to humans as well as
to animals. In Part II, I analyze Regan's arguments for
why certain animals ought to be regarded as moral
subjects as well as his response to Stich's position. My
intention behind presenting Regan's position is twofold:
(1) to show that Stich's position creates some difficulty
for Regan's ultimate goal of ascribing rights to animals
and (2) to point out that the comparison of animal to
human belief structures is not an effective way to ground
what possible claims they may have against us. I
conclude on a somewhat Heideggarian note in Part III.
I argue that animals and nature itself may be deserving
of some moral recognition just by virtue of the fact that
they afford us possibilities with respect to what we can
and do become. "Value," in a certain sense, is to be
found external to ourselves.

Contemporary skepticism concerning the mental
within philosophy of mind and psychology certainly
seems to have created hard times for ethics. Eliminative
materialists like Stich (1983) attack the very foundation
on which moral theories are based. Since moral theories
assume a certain amount of intentionality as a building
block for their legislation ofrights and obligations, any
positions that could demonstrate in some form that such
an assumption is unwarranted, in that beliefs, desires
and mental states in general cannot be shown to exist,
would seem to spell death for the ethical realm. If moral
theories require realism about cognitive elements and
their states yet are unable to present us with the evidence
that will support this requirement, then they must either
give up this requirement, and accept the view that moral
agents and subjects no longer have any sure footing
with regard to their claims concerning moral behavior
toward themselves and others, or recognize some other
way on which to ground their views. Does it have to be
the case, for instance, that consciousness and sentience
are the only conditions on which moral status can be
ascribed to beings? Or can we refer to some other
condition or set of conditions? Can we perhaps expand
our concept of morality to include animals yet without
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Part I
In their effort to respond to reductionists who
contend that beliefs correspond to certain neurological
states, eliminativists want to discard the intentional
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standard:"! Le., he takes the position that beliefs don't
exist in light of folk ps ychology's inadequate evidence
for their existence, yet he also takes the position that
allowing a total dispensation of our intentional idioms
would leave us, to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein,
"unable to go on" as we have been. So, Stich is content,
at least presently, with saying that there are events
that we refer to as "the belief that p" but that such
expressions don't refer to anyone type of event.
Given that, Stich goes on to give an account of what
he believes warrants our intuitions regarding belief
ascriptions. When we attribute "the belief that p" to
another, Stich points out that there exists an assumption
on our part that this other individual is like us in that he
will arrive at the same conclusion(s) given the same
context. What's going on here is not so much an
assumption of similarity with respect to the content of
another's state but rather an assumption of similarity
with respect to the behavior expected. Any description
given of individuals as having the same belief will
reflect the interests and expectations of the attributor,
and nothing more than that, and, of course, this
supposition also holds for ascriptions of mental states
to animals as well. Stich lays out three different criteria
for determining whether or not someone can be said to
have beliefs similar to others in their group: the first
criteria is in terms of functional or causal-pattern
similarity; the second condition emphasizes referential
similarity; and the third factor is ideological similarity.
Stich's purpose behind listing the above factors is to
show how some contexts will highlight reference, while
others will emphasize the other factors. Which one gets
emphasized depends, of course, on the concerns of the
one ascribing the belief.
Let me explain each of these factors briefly. In order
to have two beliefs count as causal-pattern similar, there
would have to be some demonstration that the
perceptual and inferential abilities were alike enough
to warrant them both having "the belief that p," Le.,
that the individuals would have to act similarly given
the same situation or, to put it in another way, that these
individuals were disposed to behave in similar ways.
Given, for example, that the brain functional capacities
of advanced Alzheimer patients are so impaired, and as
a result many of the statements they utter are
inappropriate to the contexts that they're stated in, we
would be inclined to say that their beliefs in those
instances are unlike ours and that they are in a different
type of mental state. Referential similarity and

idioms employed by folk psychological theories. Their
main purpose for doing so is that such mentalistic
vocabulary does not refer to anything. They eventually
hope to employ a new language, one which would better
explain human behavior. At the other end of the spectrum,
instrumentalists, proceeding on a more extensive concept
of "belief," contend that we can still adequately explain
behavior with our folk psychological concepts, Le., that
"beliefs," "desires," "expectations" and the like are helpful
heuristic devices for the prediction of behavior. The
instrumentalist's concept of belief ascriptions is not
limited to the description ofneural events but also involves
reference to our environment. Whether or not we really
do have beliefs, however, is not their primary concern.
What's important is that our predictions work. Realists,
like Fodor, take the fact that we have managed for
thousands of years with these predictions as a certain
amount of evidence supporting their view that beliefs do
exist. But, of course, one can't just isolate this fact as
adequate evidence that beliefs do in fact exist, since to do
so would amount to nothing more than an ad populum.
Clearly, more needs to be said on the subject, and one
mustrecognize thateliminativists are waiting in the wings
to warn us that we may not only be overly optimistic
about the accuracy of these predictions; we may also be
overrating our very ability to predict behavior.
Although generally referred to as an eliminativist,
Stephen Stich appears to occupy a midway position
between the eliminativist and the instrumentalist. Stich
advocates a syntactic theory of mind which holds that
while there is no type-type theory with regard to one's
mental states and physical states, Le., that one is not
reducible to the other, there seems to be something akin
to a type-token system where certain amounts of
"mentalese" appear to "map onto" certain amounts of
physical states. My belief that "I have a headache," for
example, means more than the experience of a particular
chemical disbalance; in addition, it refers to my
awareness that having such an experience is one to be
avoided. So Stich, in this sense, shares the wider sense
of belief that the instrumentalist employs. However,
acceptance of this view in no way commits Stich to the
position that there really are beliefs, desires, etc. Stich,
of course, denies any such inference, and it is in this
sense that he is considered an eliminativist. Although
he is sympathetic to the plight of the folk psychologist
here, he remains open to the possibility of finding some
new medium with which to interpret behavior. Hence,
he adopts what is referred to as the "Quinean double-
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to arrive home), desires and goals (its jumping up and
down for its ball and its running in order to get the
ball). Butis it the case thatFidohas such beliefs, desires,
etc.? Stich is willing to allow the ascription of certain
beliefs and desires to animals if they exhibit similar
patterns of behavior. In like circumstances, if humans
can be said to have beliefs, then so can animals. 4 The
interesting issue here, though, is whether animals do
exhibit similar patterns of behavior and whether it is
evident enough of the time for us to warrant some
assumption of similarity. In any event, whatever Stich
decided, he would not ascribe full-fledged similarity.
He really believes animals to be too unlike us for that.
In what follows, I look at Regan's arguments for
why certain animals can be said to be enough like us to
justify ascriptions not only of beliefs and other
propositional attitudes to them, but also ascriptions of
value to them.

ideological similarity seem to assume a certain amount
of functional similarity, but it's not clear that that would
have to be the case. Leaving that point aside, two
individuals can be said to exhibit referential similarity
if the object of their beliefs is the same. If what I'm
referring to is not what you're referring to when we
utter the same word or phrase, then we can't be said to
share the same belief. Ideological similarity implies a
shared network of beliefs. Two people are counted as
ideologically similar if they can draw certain (basic)
inferences from the statements that are uttered by
themselves and/or other speakers. If, for instance, I utter
the statement "Tom is an astronaut" yet can give no
explanation of who Tom is nor any explanation
concerning what an astronaut is, you would be justified
in claiming that, ideologically, I am dissimilar to you. I
am, in any event, using words that I don't understand.
Now, this set-up does permit us to say when it is
appropriate to ascribe beliefs and other propositional
attitudes to an individual, but how does it fare with respect
to animals? Stich believes that, in general, animals

Part II
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan presents
his Cumulative ArgumentS in order to show that
consistency requires an attribution of consciousness and
sentience to (certain) animals just by virtue of the fact
that humans, who have evolved from such animals, are
shown and said to have such characteristics. The animals
he refers to here are mammalian animals, one year and
older, and he sets out to prove that such animals satisfy
his Subject-of-a-Life Criterion and, hence, can be said
to have inherent value based on that satisfaction. A
Subject-of-a-Life is described as one who has

are causal-pattern dissimilar, since neither their
perception nor their inferential capacities work
quite the way ours do. And they are ideologically dissimilar, since their doxastic network
differs markedly from our own. Since they
have no language, reference similarity is out
of the question, though the causal history
component of reference similarity may have
an analogue in the causal history of animal
concepts... (These) dissimilarities lead us to
expect that we will have conflicting intuitions
about the appropriateness of using everyday
English content sentences to characterize the
cognitive states of animals. 2

beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and
a sense of the future, including their own
future; an emotional life together with feelings
of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfareinterests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit
of their desires and goals; a psychophysical
identity over time; and an individual welfare
in the sense that their experiental life fares
well or ill for them, logically independently
of their utility for others and logically
independently of their being the object of
anyone else's interests. 6

Indeed, it seems that in many situations it would be
difficult to specify the contents of animal beliefs and
other propositional attitudes. This seems true especially
with regard to the behavior of certain animals like frogs,
for example, and in such cases one really wouldn't need
to revert to anything more than Dennett's design level
in an effort to understand the frog's "psychology."3 But
can we say the same for Fido? The dog is physiologically more complex than the frog (it is more like us in
that regard), and its behavior exhibits that complexity.
Unlike the frog, it appears to have expectations (its
movement toward the front door when its Master is due
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Regan points out tllat animals such as Fido fulfill this
description, that they do have certain preference-beliefs
and will seek to satisfy such desires. This, Regan
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non-living which are part of our concept of animal. This

argues, is evident when we observe Fido digging up a
certain spot in order to retrieve his bone. Can this
behavior be explained solely at the design level? No
more than ours can, given its complexity. This type of
action indicates that what is occurring is more than just
a mere disposition to behave a certain way. Some
second-order intentionality is apparent in its behavior.
Fido, in certain contexts, does seem to be "happy,"
"eager," "ashamed," etc. But, as Regan warns us, in
order to justify these ascriptions, we cannot view the
animal's behavior atomistically, e.g., just see Fido's tail
wagging and infer from that that Fido is "happy." We
need to justify those ascriptions on a holistic basis, i.e.,
recognize the relation obtaining between the context
and Fido's behavior.? If we follow the latter method,
we will be able to offer some assessment (an adequate
one for Regan) of Fido's actions and, hence, be able to
predict certain patterns of behavior. And this, of course,
resembles what we do in our assessment of human
behavior to a certain extent.
Regan, however, wants to go a step beyond what
Stich and others would be willing to do at this point.
He claims that animals like Fido also possess certain
(albeit partial) concepts of things in the world. Fido,
for instance, has his concept of a bone, i.e., that it is
something to bury, something to chew on, something
that will satisfy a certain craving, and the like. s Stich,
however, draws the line at this point: if Fido really
does have such a concept, then why doesn't he treat
other things that are bones as bones?9 What Stich is
looking for here is some evidence that Fido views bones
qua bones. Stich eisewhere 10 raises the following
similar point:

seems true to a certain extent, but this point by itself
does not suffice as an adequate refutation of Regan's
contention that Fido has some concepts. After all, what
are the essential features in recognizing that the object
is squirrel? Aren't the shape and the smell here the
outstanding and necessary features to notice?
However, although I am sympathetic to Regan's
claim that Fido does have some concept, even if it is a
limited one, of a bone or a squirrel, there still needs to
be more said on the nature of concepts. What would
constitute the identity conditions for a concept? For
instance, how extensive must the set of beliefs be in
order for one to say that they have such a concept? Is it
enough, for example, to say that I have the concept of a
bone if I only have the beliefs that bones have a certain
shape and density? At what point do I qualify as having
the concept? If I am fooled, or am unable to pick out
the referent in this one case, does that entail that I don't
have some understanding of what a bone is? It is
interesting to note at this point in the discussion that if
another human being surprises us by her behavior in a
certain case, which is just to say that she hasn't met our
expectations in that situation, we usually tend to adopt
a principle of charity toward her. We attempt to
reconstruct some rationality to her situation. For
example, the secretary in our office tells me that she is
so hot and would love to have an ice cream cone. She
then goes on to count her change, realizing that she has
enough money to buy one. And off she goes to the
University Union where they sell ice cream cones. So
guess what I believe she'll come back with? But she
doesn't come back with an ice cream cone; she returns
instead with a sandwich. Do I now see her as irrational?
No. I say to myself that "she must have had some
reason for deciding the way she did." I give her the
benefit of the doubt. But, in the case of animals, even
our faithful Fido, we rarely apply a principle of charity
in their situations.
At most what can be said at this point is that the
extension of Fido's "concepts" of bone and squirrel are
different from ours. And so, by Stich's standards, this
would indicate a certain amount, at least, of referential
dissimilarity. Yet, the important question here is: even
if there is a lot of ideological and referential dissimilarity
between animals and us, does it follow that we can do
what we want to them? Is there some other way to
ground the view that animals deserve a certain amount
of ethical treatment other than referring to views

does Fido really believe it is a squirrel up in
the oak tree? Are there not indefinitely many
logically possible creatures which are not
squirrels but which Fido would treat indistinguishably from the way he treats real squirrels?
Indeed, does he believe, or even care, that the
thing up the tree is an animal? Would it not be
quite the same to Fido if he had been chasing
some bit of squirrel-shaped and squirrelsmelling machinery, like the mechanical
rabbits at dog-racing tracks?
What Stich obviously wants to emphasize here is that
Fido is ideologically dissimilar to us, that Fido, for
instance, does not possess the concepts of living and
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grounding our own intentionality, how will we ascribe
moral worth to ourselves? If it turns out that beliefs
and desires are fictions, wbat will become of our status
as moral agents? Gregory Sberidan raises this concern
in tlle following way:

concerning intentionality and its related issues? How
do we convince others that the fight here is worth it? I
now tum to Part III.

Part UJ

The concept of a moral agent may be largely a
prescriptive or evaluative one. It will depend
on details of the version of compatibilism
socially practiced or defended. The concept
of a moral subject, on the other hand, is a
descriptive or natural one. 12

Keep in mind that Regan's purpose bebind his
arguments is to make a "case for animal rights." He
ascribes rigbts to animals on the basis that they have
inherent value, that they satisfy his Subject-of-a-Life
Criterion. ll Yet, note what is actually going on here: in
bis effort to abandon species-chauvinism, he has, in fact,
been species-chauvinistic. The human belief-structure
is the paradigm with whicb he compares other animals.
The closer they are to being like us, the more we are
willing to ascribe them some value. It seems to me,
thougb, that the important issue bere is not wbether
animals can be said to bave concepts or are ideologically
similar or dissimilar to us. In fact, concentrating solely
on those aspects seems to miss the mark of a moral
tbeory wbich should be to construct sensible and
acceptable, if not ideal, norms for behavior. And, it's
not clear to me why we necessarily have to posit
intentionality as the deciding factor in questions
concerning what is to count as valuable and, hence,
deserving of moral respect.
In general, moral theorists have consistently viewed
the human animal as the most valuable one, as the one
whose interests and rights can override the rights (if
there be any) of any other being in the world. In fact,
many rheorists believe that humans deserve greater
moral consideration by virtue of the fact that they are
autonomous beings and capable of doing more things
than the "lower" animals. But is desert warranted here?
Holding this position amounts to no more than viewing
our position in the evolutionary scale as analogous to
some achievement on our part, that it's somewhat of an
accomplishment tllat we "managed" to get to the top
of tlle process, and because of that, we've earned a
certain amount of consideration. Yet tllis is not tlle case:
we are just members of a species that evolved, and
with that process came a greater adaptability to the
environment. So as a species we ended up witll an
advanced belief structure. Yet having a greater
potential to manipulate one's environment is not
something we earned.
We should also at this time keep in mind that if it
turns ou t that eliminativism is true, we are not in a better
position than the animals here. If we have a problem
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Keeping in mind tbat the requirements for moral
subjectivity are just consciousness and sentience,
Sberidan completes bis point by stating
Chuck the concept of a moral subject, our
belief that ourselves and others deserve moral
consideration, ...and we bave nothing. Moral
reasoning loses its point altogether. 13
Clearly, we want to save our notion of a moral
subject, yet without necessarily talking about beliefs
per se or any other related intentionality issue. I propose
that we move from a purely Kantian view to a more
Heideggarian one. This is to essentially view value as
external to ourselves, not as originating witll ourselves.
Taking tllis position, of course, requires that we lose
some of our self-importance, that we view ourselves as
part of the world, as members of a species among other
species. It is to adopt a holistic attitude toward nature
and, bence, recognize tllat Nature itself is a necessary
condition for our existence. The existence of things in
nature has afforded us not only life but also possibility.
We are what we are because of IT. IT allows us to
flourisb; IT lets us be. And because of that, we need to
adopt an attitude of graciousness, Le., realize that we
have been graced with existence and possibility. IT
gives us tllis, and for tllat we need to realize ITs value.
An attitude of graciousness, tllen, requires an attitude
of respect, not harm. And this attitude of respect is not
just limited to animals; it should also open the door to
the environment itself.
Eliminativism, tllen, doesn't bave to pose a threat
to us. But this will entail changing our view of ourselves
as all-important by virtue of our rationality to one wbicb
realizes that, at base, we are one species among many
and that these others give us (to a great extent) our being.
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I knew what he wanted.
Once before I had found a cat
Looking for a place to die
And I had tempted her
To choose life.
And so, once again
I will weigh the balance
And for better or for worse
Persuade this old traveller
To live
And to find reason to live.

Mary de La Valette
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